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RECENT DECISIONS
will be invalidated under the equal pro-
tection clause remains to be seen. In
any event, it would appear that future
attempts by the states to exercise their
Sit-in Conduct Held
Constitutionally Protected
The five Negro petitioners had entered
a small regional library1 in Louisiana with
the intention of staging a sit-in. Peti-
tioner Brown requested a particular book.
The librarian, after a search, informed
the petitioner that the library did not
contain the book desired, but that she
would arrange to obtain it for him from
the state library. After this service had
been rendered, the five petitioners were
requested to vacate the library by the
librarian, her supervisor, and finally by
the sheriff. When petitioners refused to
leave they were arrested and later con-
victed of violating Louisiana's "breach of
peace" statute.' The United States Su-
preme Court, in a five to four decision,
reversed the conviction and held that
petitioners' conduct was constitutionally
protected under the first and fourteenth
amendments. Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131 (1966).
In 1865 slavery was ended in this
1 The library in question was a local service
facility without any reading room. The room
where the events took place was quite small,
containing two tables and one chair (excluding
those used by the librarians), a stove, a card
catalogue, and open bookshelves. Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 135 (1966).
2 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103.1 (Supp. 1965).
power over voting qualifications will be
carefully scrutinized and possibly severely
limited by that uncertainty which often
accompanies such a broad interpretation.
country by the ratification of the thirteenth
amendment. Subsequently, the fourteenth
amendment granted to all Americans equal
protection of the laws, the privileges and
immunities of citizens, and guaranteed
that no state would deprive any person of
his life, liberty or property without due
process of law. In addition, the fifteenth
amendment guaranteed all citizens the
right to vote without regard to race or
color.4 These amendments, followed by
potentially powerful civil rights legisla-
tion,5 apparently gave the Negro a massive
array of federally protected rights. These
rights, however, were soon limited by
decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
In 1872, in the Slaughter-House Cases,
the fourteenth amendment was interpreted
as protecting from state action only the
"privileges and immunities" conferred up-
on one as a citizen of the United States.7
Thus, those rights which derived from
state citizenship were deemed not pro-
tected from state action by the fourteenth
:i U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
5E.g., 14 Stat, 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1964); 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1964); 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1964).
r83 U.S. 36 (1872).
See id. at 78-80.
amendment.8 As a result, the doctrine of
"dual citizenship," which distinguishes be-
tween federal and state citizenship, was
explicitly formulated.
The Supreme Court utilized this doc-
trine in The Civil Rights Cases.9 There,
the Court struck down as unconstitutional
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 0 which
provided:
That all persons within the United States
shall be entitled to the full and equal en-
joyment of the accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, and privileges of inns,
public conveyances on land or water,
theaters and other places of public amuse-
ment ....
The Court made it clear that the four-
teenth amendment does not invest Con-
gress with the power to legislate upon
subjects which are the particular concern
of state legislatures. It does not authorize
Congress to create a code of municipal
law for the regulation of private rights,
but authority is given to preclude the
operation of state law and conduct of
state officers where they infringe upon
fundamental rights. Consequently, the
limits of state action were strictly drawn
so that the amendment's applicability to
the civil rights area was limited.
A further limitation was placed on the
effectiveness of the fourteenth amendment
in Plessy v. Ferguson." In this case, the
Court established the "separate but equal"
doctrine, which provides that the utiliza-
tion of distinct but comparable facilities
for Negroes does not violate rights guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment.'
Id. at 74.
109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
18 Stat. 336 (1875).
''163 U.S. 537 (1896).
12 Id. at 543-44.
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The Court emphasized that since the
rights derived from state citizenship were
more clearly delineated, those rights de-
rived from federal citizenship could not
be relied upon to overcome legitimate
state use of the "separate but equal"
doctrine.
The apparent finality of this doctrine
had a dampening effect on the expansion
of civil rights in the area of racial segre-
gation. 1" However, the 1930's brought
about a renewal of interest and concern
in this area, due in part to the great
social upheaval of the times.' 4 The deci-
sions handed down by the Supreme Court
during this period tended to discourage
racial discrimination while protecting the
rights of the Negro in numerous areas,
including criminal prosecution," educa-
tion,16 voting rights,17 housing, 18 and rail-
road dining."9 Nevertheless, while some
inroads had been made, the "separate but
equal" doctrine remained the major
obstacle to further progress in the area
of civil rights.
In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Educ.-'"
the Court overruled the "separate but
13 But see Guin v. United States, 238 U.S. 347
(1915); Warley v. Buchanan, 245 U.S. 60
(1917).
"This renewal was also brought about by the
change in procedural rules of the United States
Supreme Court. Under the statute presently con-
tained in 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1964), the Court
was permitted to review cases by certiorari rather
than solely by appeal, thus giving it greater lati-
tude in the selection of cases for review.
' Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
if Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938).
17 Smith v. Allwright, 231 U.S. 649 (1944).
1 Shelley v. Kraemer, 339 U.S. 1 (1948).
",Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816
(1950).
20347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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equal" doctrine and held that separate
educational facilities were a deprivation
of the equal protection guarantee of the
fourteenth amendment. 21  Although this
decision was the death blow to the "separ-
ate but equal" doctrine, in reality, it had
little practical effect on racial discrimin-
ation. Only in the past six years, with the
increased use of "sit-in" demonstrations
and the consequent cases, has the impact
of Brown v. Board of Educ. been felt by
the states. 2
There have been numerous arrests and
convictions of "sit-in" demonstrators,
frequently for violation of state trespass
laws or breach of peace statutes.23 In
Louisiana, in particular, there have been
three convictions for violations of its
breach of peace statute, all of which have
been reversed by the United States Su-
preme Court. In the first of these cases,
Garner v. Louisiana,2 4 decided in 1961,
the Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tions of the Negro petitioners who alleg-
edly violated Louisiana's breach of peace
statute.2 5 In Garner the petitioners sat
at "white" lunch counters and refused to
obey an order to leave. They were
arrested because their conduct was held
to be such as would "unreasonably and
21 Id. at 495.
22 For development of the "sit-in" movement, see
generally Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations:
Events and Legal Problems of First Sixty Days,
1960 DUKE L.J. 315, 317 (1960).
23 Id. at 350-51, 343-44.
24368 U.S. 157 (1961).
25 "Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of
the following in such a manner as would fore-
seeably disturb or alarm the public: . . .
7) Commission of any other act in such a
manner as to unreasonably disturb or alarm
the public." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103(7)
(1942).
foreseeably disturb the public. 2  The
Court found that this section of the sta-
tute, as previously construed by Louisiana
courts, encompassed conduct which is
either violent or boisterous in itself, or
which is so provocative in nature as to
induce a foreseeable physical disturbance.
It was pointed out that the statute, in
and of itself, did not reach peaceful and
orderly conduct, such as that of the peti-
tioners. 27 Furthermore, the Court noted
that the Louisiana legislature, shortly after
petitioners' protest, had amended the sta-
tute in question, in order to reach peace-
ful "sit-in" demonstrations . 2 The negative
inference that it did not previously en-
compass this situation substantiated the
Court's interpretation of the statute.
Again, in Taylor v. Louisiana," six
Negroes had been arrested and convicted
of violating Louisiana's amended breach
of peace statute since they failed to leave
a "white only" waiting room in a bus
depot when ordered to by the local chief
of police. The Court, relying on Garner,
reversed the conviction stating that:
the only evidence to support the charge
was that petitioners were violating a cus-
tom that segregated people in waiting
rooms according to their race, a practice
not allowed in interstate transportation
facilities by reason of federal law.2 0
2,; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 158 (1961).
2
7 Id. at 167.
23 "Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of
the peace, or under circumstances such that a
breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby:
refuses to leave the premises of another when
requested to do so by any owner, lessee, or
any employee thereof, shall be guilty of dis-
turbing the peace." LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:103.1(A)(4) (Supp. 1965).
2!370 U.S. 154 (1962).
30 Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154, 156 (1962).
Both Garner and Taylor stand for the
proposition that the United States Su-
preme Court will not uphold convictions
based on statutes designed to outlaw
peaceful protests in or upon a segregated
facility, be it private or public, wherein
the defendants were either denied service
or asked to leave solely because of their
color. This proposition was further de-
veloped in Cox v. Louisiana "' which in-
volved a conviction of a civil rights leader
under the same Louisiana breach of
peace statute. He had led a crowd into
a predominantly white business district
whereupon he actively urged the crowd
to sit-in at "white only" lunch counters
until they were served. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction and held
that petitioner's conduct in addressing the
demonstrators in a peaceful manner was
constitutionally protected by first amend-
ment guarantees of free speech and as-
sembly.12  Thus, the Court progressed
from the Garner and Taylor rationales,
viz., mere statutory interpretations, and
chose to base its reversal on broader
constitutional grounds.
The object of the demonstration in the
instant case was to protest the discrimin-
atory practices of the Louisiana library
system which maintained two separate
bookmobiles, one for whites and the other
for Negroes. Ironically, however, the
library at which petitioners staged their
protest, at least on this occasion, did not
practice discrimination. Instead, the libra-
rian was cooperative and attempted to
obtain the book requested. Because of
:11 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
32 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545, 552
(1965).
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their persistence in remaining in the
library after numerous requests to leave,
the petitioners were arrested and convicted
of violating the Louisiana breach of peace
statute. Mr. Justice Fortas, writing for
the Court, declared that the petitioners'
conduct was even less disruptive than
that involved in any of the preceding
three situations in which the Court in-
validated convictions under the same Lou-
isiana statute or its predecessor. The first
case, Garner, was utilized to show the
validity of a "peaceful and orderly protest
demonstration, with no intent to provoke
a breach of the peace. .... ,,3" Taylor and
Cox were compared to the fact situation
of the instant case to refute the conten-
tion that a breach of the peace might be
"occasioned" by the petitioners' sit-in.
It was stated that:
[S]urely there was less danger that a
breach of the peace might occur from Mrs.
Katie Reeves and Mrs. Perkin in the
.. library than that disorder might result
from the restless white people in the bus
depot waiting room in Taylor, or the 100
to 300 'grumbling' white onlookers in
Cox.
34
Mr. Justice Brennan, in a concurring
opinion, pointed out that petitioners' right
to protest was constitutionally protected
and could not be interfered with by the
state. His interpretation of Cox was that
it made the statute in the instant case
unconstitutional on its face.3 5 Mr. Justice
White, in his concurring opinion, stated
that it was difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the petitioners were asked to leave
the library because they were Negroes.
Assuming this conclusion to be true, he
:V1 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 140 (1966).
:14 Id. at 140.
3 5d. at 143-50.
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urged reversal of the convictions on the
ground that petitioners were denied the
"equal protection of the laws" guaranteed
to them by the fourteenth amendment.3 6
Mr. Justice Black, with Justices Clark,
Harlan and Stewart concurring, wrote the
dissenting opinion, in which he contended
that the majority had erroneously relied
upon the Court's prior decisions in its
desire to protect civil rights demonstrators.
In support of his contention, Mr. Justice
Black pointed out the following: (1) the
convictions in Garner were obtained under
a different statute than confronted the
Court in the instant case; (2) there was
no indication whatsoever in Taylor that
the petitioners therein had a constitutional
right to remain in the bus depot, if they
had no business there and had been re-
quested to leave by the proper authori-
ties; and, (3) there was an erroneous
interpretation of Cox in both the majority
opinion and Mr. Justice Brennan's concur-
ring opinion, in that the Court in Cox
held unconstitutional only that part of
the statute that was properly before it.
This part related only to public streets,
sidewalks, and ways, and not to public
buildings as were involved in the instant
case. He further maintained that the al-
leged discriminatory practices in Louisiana
should have no bearing on the instant
case since no discrimination was practiced
upon the petitioners. Therefore, he
argued, the convictions of the defendants
were sustainable and the Court should
not substitute its own judgment for that
of the state court. In conclusion, the dis-
senting opinion emphasized that the full
impact on public order of the holding of
36Id. at 151.
the majority would not be felt until
similar demonstrators staged a "sit-in"
in a large library's reading room, in a
school or a courthouse?3
In evaluating the significance of the
instant case, it must be constantly recog-
nized that the courts should protect civil
rights demonstrators only so long as their
activity does not infringe upon the basic
freedoms of others not involved in the
protest. While it may seem that the basic
freedoms of the members of the general
public are not inhibited by permitting
a small disturbance in this Louisiana
branch library, the holding of the instant
case throws into doubt the right of the
person in charge of an establishment to
maintain order therein. The members of
the public do have a right, though per-
haps it would be difficult for anyone to
legally enforce it, to have order maintained
in the public institutions and establish-
ments which are necessary to modern life.
Therefore, those in charge of such estab-
lishments must be allowed the flexibility
of control necessary to maintain order.
Mr. Justice Black's warning against
the severe potential effects on the public
order of the Court's decision has some
validity since it points up the fact that
the Court has balanced the potential
effect of the petitioners' activity on the
public order against the worthiness of
their cause and perhaps the general un-
worthiness of the motives of the State of
Louisiana. Where the conduct of sit-in
demonstrators threatened and/or caused
great inconvenience to a considerable
number of people, as in Mr. Justice
37 ld. at 151-68.
Black's examples, the Court would pro-
bably uphold these convictions under a
similar statute. But, within the rationale
of the instant case there is authority for
the proposition that a peaceful demon-
stration by any person for a cause he
believes just, whether erroneously or not,
cannot be halted by the person duly
charged with authority to maintain order
in the place of the demonstration. For
example, a group of teenagers who believe
that the supervisor of a library is practic-
ing unfair discrimination against them be-
cause they are permitted to use only cer-
tain rooms in the library could now stage
a "sit-in" and disrupt the operation of the
library. Under the rationale of the instant
case, it could be strongly argued that
they could not be required to leave or be
arrested pursuant to a breach-of-peace type
statute, since their conduct in protesting
this discrimination is constitutionally pro-
tected. Therefore, the Court in its desire
to protect the Negro may have opened
the doors of all establishments to anyone
who believes he has a valid cause. It, at
least, has made likely further inroads by
CHILD BENEFITS
(Continued)
former Commissioner Keppel's twin ob-
jectives. As he phrased them, they are:
First, to raise the quality of education in
our schools everywhere and for everyone.
In the 20th century, we cannot tolerate
second-class education if we intend to re-
main a first-class nation.
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demonstrators on the public order, as
they will probe for the point at which the
Court will refuse constitutional protection
to disruptive demonstrations.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the
distinctions made by the dissent between
the instant case and the precedents relied
upon are valid. First, in Garner, the
petitioners were actually discriminated
against at the time of demonstration,
whereas in the instant case, no such dis-
crimination had as yet occurred. Second,
the rationale of Taylor is inapplicable,
since here no discrimination was practiced
at the locality of the demonstration. And
finally, the standards imposed upon a
state in measuring disturbances upon the
street, the situation in Cox, cannot be the
same for measuring disturbances in public
buildings. Thus, it appears that the Court,
in trying to promote and aid Negro equal-
ity, has established a potential base from
which the vague but real right of the
general public to order may be assaulted
by demonstrators in ways not necessary
to the preservation of constitutionally pro-
tected civil rights.
Second, to bring equality of educational
opportunity to every child in America
whatever his color, or creed, or handicap,
or family circumstance. 43
. Address by former United States Commis-
sioner of Education Francis Keppel before the
Council of Chief State School Officers in Hono-
lulu, Hawaii, November 10, 1965.
GOVERNMENT BIRTH CONTROL
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(Continued)
opinions of the Supreme Court justices in
Griswold! The opinion of the Court,
written by Mr. Justice Douglas,27 ranged
over the greatest variety of sources in the
decided cases for its inspirations and con-
cepts-cases involving private schools,
2 s
freedom of reading,29 freedom to teach,
23
freedom of association, 1  search and
seizure,' 2 and self-incrimination.3
At a lawyers' meeting at Washington,
last February, I heard the right of privacy
in government birth control programs de-
rided as having "no foundation in the law
reviews." Neither did many of our now
27Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-
84 (1965).
2SPierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
29Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1942).
30Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
MI NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
32 Mapp y. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS
(Continued)
of legal institutions, for correctness of
procedures in institutional processes is the
correlative of rightness of quality in in-
dividual living. Institutional procedures
are adjudged correct from the standpoint
of the universal principles of natural law
to the extent to which they keep alive
the purposive side of man's nature and
recognized civil rights a half century ago.
New developments require new legal
thinking. The right of privacy in relation
to government birth control has been little
considered due to fears over population
growth and (upon the part of some Catho-
lics) due to fears that the Church be
seeming to impose its particular views
respecting the morality of contraception
upon the whole of a religiously plural so-
ciety at the dawn of an age of ecumenism
and a time of a new awareness of the
Secular City. I see no inconsistency be-
tween the spirit of one who wholeheartedly
greets this dawn and of the lawyer whose
task remains the law. I stress this because
technological and social forces of our time
mount threats to human privacy which
law alone will suffice to counter. If we
are to have government birth control in
any stabile form in the future, now is the
time to be civilizing it and lawyers must
be the conscience of the movement to do
so.
maintain communication. Beyond this
universal judgment, the propriety and im-
propriety of the detailed content of the
life of institutions and individuals depend
on factors other than the substantive
natural law and relate to man in his
essence. Because Fuller considers the de-
tailed content of the life of an institution
and an individual to be not properly a
matter for absolutistic moral judgments
(so long as the universal principles that
constitute the most basic dimension of
substantive natural law are not violated)
and because Fuller emphasizes the pro-
cedural aspects of legal and other insti-
tutions, it might look as if he is a moral
relativist, as if he fails to attend to the
question of right ends, and as if his
natural law is merely technological. But
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the fact is that Fuller's emphasis on
proper procedures rests on, is derived
from, and is justified by his postulated
understanding of the nature of man which
provides a process view of the "end"
of man and a universal basis for moral
judgments.
